INT RODUCT ION
Th e World Health Org ani z ati on' s CHOICE p rog ram analy z es th e cost effecti veness of vari ou s h ealth i nterventi ons related to th e Mi llenni u m Develop ment Goals. 1 Th e p rog ram i d enti fi es th e b est strateg i es for i mp rovi ng h ealth i n low-i ncome cou ntri es, u si ng a stand ard set of meth od olog i cal assu mp ti ons. 2 Th ese stu d i es evalu ate i nterventi ons i n many areas, i nclu d i ng ch i ld h ealth 3 Th e most cost effecti ve i nterventi ons are mass med i a camp ai g ns for safer sex , p eer ed u cati on and treatment of sex work ers, p reventi on of moth er to ch i ld transmi ssi on (P MCT), treatment of sex u ally transmi tted i nfecti ons, volu ntary cou nseli ng and testi ng , and AR V th erap y . (2004) . One cannot h ave i t b oth way s; i f p atents are i nd eed u ni mp ortant i n d evelop i ng cou ntri es, th en th e d ru g i nd u stry wou ld n' t b e h u rt b y g i vi ng u p th ose p atent rents. F or a more Drug prices are uniquely susceptible to radical price reductions through generic competition. Patented pharmaceuticals may be priced at more than 30 times the marginal cost of production; 6 the excess is the patent rent collected by the drug company while the patent and exclusive marketing periods remain. Patent rents are significant. AIDS drugs which sell for US$ 10,000 per person per year in the US are sold generically for less than US$ 200. 7 If patented drugs could be sold at the marginal cost of production, cost effective treatments would become even more attractive, and other interventions would become affordable.
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing 8 for most essential medicines used in the developing world. Global collection of patent rents must be relaxed in order to achieve this objective. Some damage to the profits of pharmaceutical companies would ordinarily be expected, but a properly designed buy-out mechanism can ensure adequate incentives for pharmaceutical innovation.
Two case studies are examined to illustrate the proposal: the recently-developed Human Papillomavirus (HPV) vaccines for cervical cancer and second-line antiretroviral (ARV) treatments for AIDS.
Global pharmaceutical markets and global disease burdens are mismatched, making this proposal uniquely attractive. Some 80% to 90% of the global sales of patented pharmaceuticals occur in the 30 wealthy countries which are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), roughly similar to the World Bank's definition of 29 high-income countries. Pharmaceutical markets for patented products largely follow the money.
But the vast majority of patients needing treatment for global chronic and infectious diseases reside in non-OECD (middle-and low-income) countries. These countries include more than 84% of the world's people, and they are disproportionately sick. The global burden of disease falls most heavily where the market is least attractive.
This mismatch between global pharmaceutical markets and global disease burdens leads to an interesting opportunity.
Patented pharmaceuticals could be offered to more than 84% of the world's population at generic prices. (Only high-income country patients would bear pharmaceutical patent rents). The gain in health from increasingly affordable pharmaceuticals would be considerable. The primary disadvantage of this plan would be a quite small reduction in global R&D cost recovery; but even this small deficit could be restored to the companies through a carefully designed patent buy-out mechanism.
I. Global Diseases: Beyond Neglected Diseases
Much attention has been focused over the past decade upon ' neglected' or ' tropical' diseases, conditions largely overlooked by global pharmaceutical research companies. 9 Examples include onchocerciasis (river blindness), 10 leishmaniasis (kala-azar), Chagas disease, and African sleeping sickness. 11 In the past few years, donors have created many initiatives to direct R&D towards neglected diseases. 12 The neglected disease programme tends to overlook the fact that chronic conditions in the high-income and low-income worlds are converging. 13 Global diseases are conditions which affect patients in both rich and poor countries, 14 and the list includes many of the major chronic conditions associated with wealthy countriesincluding cardiovascular disease, stroke, mental illness, diabetes, and arthritis.
These wealthy country diseases are also the leading causes of adult disease burdens throughout the world: communicable diseases were responsible for 59% of total global mortality and 43% of the global burden of disease. Importantly, 78% of [ non-communicable disease] deaths were borne by low-and middle income countries, as was 85% of the NCD burden of disease . . . nearly 50% of deaths worldwide were due to CVD, diabetes, cancer and chronic lung disease." ). 14 Herein, the term global disease refers to conditions for which a therapeutic market exists in high-income countries, and the condition is also endemic to the low or middle income world. The definition of global disease is not static. Malaria was once a global disease, but is now largely eradicated in high-income countries, rendering it potentially neglected were it not for research for military and tourist markets. Tuberculosis remains a significant condition in OECD markets, even though its disease burden falls heavily on the poor. For a fuller discussion on global diseases in this context, The first characteristic of global diseases is that a robust level of innovation is assured by high-income markets alone. Anticipated R&D cost recovery from low-and middle-income countries carry little or no weight in the decision to commit resources to R&D concerning global diseases. The powerful lure of high-income markets -particularly the US and EU -draw R&D funds to global diseases, without much regard for the market potential in Brazil or Costa Rica. 17 AIDS is a paradigmatic case of a global disease. Several thousand early AIDS cases in the United States and Europe were sufficient to trigger an avalanche of science. 18 The global aspects of the epidemic were either unknown or relatively unimportant to the decision to allocate research resources. ARV drugs would have been invented on 16 In terms of DALYs lost due to these conditions in women aged 15 and above, the same timetable even if no African or Asian had ever been infected. High-income markets alone were sufficient incentive for discovery.
Cancer is another global disease. Development of HPV vaccines was prompted by the multi-billion dollar market to prevent less than 17,000 cervical cancer deaths per year in high-income countries. 19 Similar global disease profiles exist for other cancers: one recent study listed the 12 major types of cancer for which the global burden of disease largely falls in the low-and middle-income countries. 20 In every category the majority of the global cancer disease burden fell in low-and middle-income countries.
Only cancers of the lungs, pancreas, colon and rectum were disproportionately found in highincome countries, but nevertheless the majority of the burden remained in low-and middle-income countries. 21 Global diseases have a second important characteristic: global disease innovation can be shared without damaging commerce. Knowledge is nonrivalrous. 22 Global disease innovation can be offered to low-and medium-income countries without damaging patent rents from highincome countries. While diversion, theft and arbitrage from lowincome to high-income markets is a potential threat, companies and governments possess many tools to block pharmaceutical arbitrage, and empirical evidence of significant dysfunctional arbitrage is limited. 23 The much more significant threat to high-income country patent rents -and to public health -is from counterfeit pharmaceuticals, which are greatly encouraged by the high price discrimination ratios made 19 possible by IP law. 24 Counterfeit pharmaceuticals are a grave threat to health in the developing world, 25 and the US drug supply chain itself appears remarkably vulnerable. 26 One important ancillary advantage of generic pricing is the virtual elimination of the incentive to counterfeit drugs in low-and medium-income countries: with artificial price discrimination stripped away, the vast majority of the economic incentive to create a counterfeit disappears. 27 With innovation assured, the further collection of patent rents can stand aside and permit generic-priced access for the majority of humanity. The fruits of OECD global disease innovation can be freely shared with the low-and middle-income world through marginal cost pricing without harming innovation incentives.
We now turn to two case studies to examine in more depth the potential for generic pricing in low-and middle-income countries.
II. Case Studies

A. Cervical Cancer Vaccines
Cervical cancer is a significant global cause of cancer death for women. More than 470,000 cases are diagnosed each year, 28 resulting in approximately 230,000 annual deaths globally. 29 Cervical cancer exemplifies the split between global disease burdens and markets: 92% of cervical cancer deaths occur in low-and middle-income 24 countries, 30 while more than 90% of the market will be in high-income countries. 31 Vaccines for cervical cancer are expected to be approved by the US FDA in the near future.
In 2002, Merck's vaccine for Human Papillomavirus Type 16 (HPV-16) demonstrated significant efficacy against cervical cancer in a controlled trial. 32 In November 2004, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) published its positive results for a bivalent HPV-16 and -18 vaccine (Cervarix), based on trials in the US and Brazil. 33 The health potential for a generic priced HPV vaccine in low-and middle-income countries is significant.
Within a generation of widespread vaccination, cervical cancer could be largely eradicated. GSK projects that its vaccine will be cost effective "in both screened and unscreened populations, with important long-term implications for cervical cancer prevention, especially in countries where screening is limited or unavailable." 34 In the US, GSK's Cervarix program is projected to cost between US$20,600 to US$60,000 per quality-adjusted life year (QALY), amounts which are considered cost effective in the US market. 35 The GSK study does not disclose the anticipated US sales price of Cervarix in this model, 36 but these estimates suggest that GSK could raise the vaccine price significantly in the US market while still keeping the QALY cost below US$75,000. 37 Indeed, the study modeled total vaccination costs up to US$1000 per patient, at which point vaccination became less cost effective than screening alone. 38 This data suggests an upper limit price of the Cervarix vaccine series at approximately US$623. 39 GSK projects annual sales of Cervarix to exceed £ 1 billion, 40 a blockbuster drug. While we do not know GSK's anticipated unit price, the total female population aged 12 in all high-income countries is approximately 6 million persons. 41 If GSK anticipates meeting half of that volume, 42 then their Cervarix price in high-income countries must be approximately £ 333 per person, or about US$570. 43 A cervical cancer vaccine which is affordable and just marginally cost effective in the US market will be too expensive and cost ineffective for the average family in a low-or middle-income market where health expenditures per capita average US$73.40. 44 Even a vaccine priced at 10% of the high-income price (say, US$57) is completely unaffordable. 36 The model identifies 'vaccination costs' of US$377 (base case), with a range of US$188 to US$565, but Table 1 does not identify how much is allocated to the "three brief clinic visits, surveillance and education costs" and how much derives from the cost of the vaccine itself. Sue J. Goldie For a patent buy-out price of less than US$30 million per year, Cervarix could instantly become a generic medicine in all low-and middle-income countries. The bulk of the world's women would enjoy much greater access to a cervical cancer vaccine through generic pricing. GSK would be fully rewarded for its lost sales in low-and middle-income markets. The proposal is a bargain for global public health and good business for GSK.
Diagnostic tests for cervical cancer
Diagnostic tests present special cost effectiveness issues. Cheaper diagnostics for AIDS (such as CD4 counts) or microbial infections (identifying susceptibility to enable better targeting of antibiotics) could lead to more cost effective treatment with less potential for developing resistance. 46 But diagnostic tests might also inappropriately drive up health care costs.
For example, Digene Corporation 47 has developed a diagnostic test for HPV. 48 What is not known at present is whether a cheaper diagnostic would be cost effective from a societal view. In the US, routine Pap screening leads to several billion dollars of clinical intervention of doubtful efficacy and cost effectiveness since most HPV infections regress on their own. 49
The wasteful use of clinical resources following abnormal Pap screening is well known; indeed, GSK's HPV-16/18 vaccine derives a significant portion of its projected cost effectiveness from avoiding "more than US$6 billion … spent each year on the evaluation and management of low-grade lesions, the majority of which would regress without intervention." 50 Of more immediate importance to the developing world, Digene has also created a streamlined version of the HPV test for use in resourcelimited settings. 51 It is quite possible that more effective detection of HPV might lead to clinical interventions with very unfavorable cost effectiveness profiles, inappropriately expanding profligate US practices to resource constrained settings. Nevertheless, the patent holder for the HPV test is engaged in a global campaign to promote the adoption of its test as the global standard of care, utilizing clinical sales representatives, direct to consumer advertising, and strategic relationships with women's groups and providers. 52 
B. Second-Line HAART Drugs For AIDS
When the Millennium Development Goals were first articulated, treatment of AIDS with antiretroviral drugs was not considered cost effective for low-income populations.
Annual costs per patient exceeded US$7,000 for first-line Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) in drug costs alone. 53 In the world's low-income countries, per capita health expenditures are only US$29. 54 As recently as December 2000, HAART prices were so high that the World Bank still considered ARV treatment in poor countries to not be cost effective. 55 HAART was simply too expensive.
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Partners
In Health refused to listen to conventional wisdom and began treating some of the world's poorest AIDS patients with HAART. 56 In the days before the global implementation of the World Trade Organization TRIPS Agreement, 57 several Indian and Thai companies produced HAART drugs generically, even though the patent remained valid in OECD countries. 58 The combination of public outcry and generic competition forced the prices down to less than US$200 per patient per year. 59 With these dramatic cost reductions, HAART therapy is now deemed cost effective worldwide.
One recent study evaluated several strategies regarding HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO region: Afr-E) and South East Asia (Sear-D). The study recommends a range of HIV/AIDS interventions which are highly cost effective in lowincome countries, with a cost per disability adjusted life year (DALY) ranging from Int$3 to Int$1144 in Afr-E. 60 The study assumes the annual drug cost of first-line HAART to be Int$177.80, 61 following the data gathered by MSF. 62 Unfortunately, some patients cannot remain on first-line HAART drugs indefinitely. Whether due to resistance or intolerance to specific drugs, after a number of years an increasing number of surviving patients require second-line therapy.
Second-line drugs such as protease inhibitors are not generally available at generic prices in the developing world. 63 Patented second-line therapies are very expensive in low-income countries. Even with voluntary discount programs, second-line therapies cost ten to twenty-six times more than the firstline drugs. 64 The world is stumbling towards a second AIDS holocaust, even while we struggle to make first-line therapies affordable and available to the millions who lack treatment access. 65
The non-OECD buy-out price for HAART first-and second-line treatments would be modest, given the scale of the epidemic. Pharmaceutical companies will not suffer significant lost profit if all sales of HAART products dropped to zero in every low-and middleincome country. GSK is the largest global seller of HAART drugs. GSK reports its sales to the SEC in three geographic regions: the United States, Europe, and "International." This latter category includes highincome countries such as Japan, Canada and Australia, as well as lowand middle-income countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Even so, total International HAART drug sales in 2003 were only £155 million, 66 in a year in which gross profit was £17.2 billion and selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses were £7.5 billion. Actual profits from HAART sales in both low-and middleincome markets are likely to be negligible to GSK's global profits and R&D, particularly if OECD markets in these countries remain commercial. The estimated non-OECD buy-out price for all of GSK's HAART portfolio is just US$11.3 million per year in lost R&D cost recovery. 67 The annual budget of the Global AIDS Conference exceeds this amount with millions to spare. 68 With the lives of millions at risk, and billions being spent on AIDS programs, the buy-out price is stunning in its modesty.
C. The Weakness of Voluntary Pricing Programs
Voluntary programs undoubtedly assist some patients.
Novartis makes Glivec (imatrinib) available to 346 chronic myeloid leukemia patients in Malaysia through a patient-based assistance program. 69 Voluntary donations of ARVs reach some AIDS patients, and many donor programs are under way, but 90% of the global need is unmet. 70 Pfizer's limited donation of Diflucan (fluconazole) (an antifungal agent useful for many purposes, including opportunistic infections in AIDS patients) was a public relations triumph in December 2000, 71 and yet complaints persist that Pfizer only permits a miniscule amount to reach patients. 72 In November 2005, Merck and Bristol Myers Squibb granted royalty-free licenses to the International Partnership for Microbicides for an anti-HIV vaginal gel. 73 The grants are laudable steps, but are limited to a very specific product. 74 In the most notable cases, significant voluntary price reductions were triggered by unlicensed generic production or the threat of compulsory licensure. 75 No one should mistake voluntary programs for a systematic, sustainable solution. 76
III. The Patent Buy-Out Proposal
This Article proposes marginal cost (generic) pricing of patented pharmaceuticals for low-and middle-income populations (more than 84% of the world's population). Innovation is assured by reimbursing the companies for all lost R&D cost recoveries in those markets. Risks are minimized because the present IP system is retained for more than 80% of the global patent-based cash flow of the pharmaceutical companies. The following steps are proposed: 3. The patent owner is compensated under a buy-out formula which mimics the lost R&D cost recovery from the foregone sales. (Example: GSK is paid for the lost R&D cost recovery from cervical cancer vaccine sales in non-OECD countries).
A. The Purchaser
The purchaser could be a government (the US or the EU), intergovernmental organization (WHO, UN, WTO, or the Global Fund), or a foundation donor (Gates). Governments can exercise compulsory licensure powers within their territories, but this proposal cannot rely solely on the current scope of compulsory licensure. The transaction costs and political opposition to negotiating compulsory licenses for each market country have proven to be almost insurmountable. In the years since the much-hyped 'Doha Solution' to compulsory licenses for export, not a single pill has been produced under that protocol. 77 By offering compensation in exchange for the non-OECD license, it is hoped that pharmaceutical companies will embrace this proposal rather than force governments to pursue parallel compulsory licensure processes.
B. The Target Market
The simplest formulation would divide the world in two: the thirty relatively richer countries that are members of the OECD 78 , and all other countries. Simplicity means rough justice, but surely rough justice is better than no justice. Poverty does not strictly follow political boundaries. Some elites in poor countries will gain access to generic-priced medicines when they could have afforded full price. Some poor people in OECD countries may not be able to afford their prescriptions, and could have benefited from generic pricing. 79 Perhaps the latter group can be left to the care of their relativelyaffluent governments (although in the US, approximately 66 million people lacked prescription drug insurance in 2005 prior to the introduction of Medicare Part D). Over-inclusion of developing-country elites is more likely to attract controversy.
Over-inclusion results in lost patent rents, particularly in countries like China, India and Brazil with millions of upper-middle class consumers. If simplicity is desired, this over-inclusion will simply be tolerated. It will increase the buy-out price, so the companies still receive their due rewards. If anything, the inequity is between the donor and the target country government. Perhaps China, Brazil or India (or similar countries) could compensate the donor for this inappropriate subsidy.
Alternatively, PhRMA companies have demonstrated remarkable skill in segmenting markets with tiered differential pricing within particular countries. The persistence of domestic differential pricing within the US, even in the face of extensive donor programs, is a testament to the effectiveness of market segmentation by PhRMA companies and the apparent weakness of actual pharmaceutical arbitrage pressure.
Possible mechanisms are brand campaigns with trademarks, differential pricing by payor, and domestic legal restrictions on arbitrage. 80 
[DoC testimony]
[non-OECD members of EU? , parallel trade restrictions within EU].
C. The Generic License
The purchaser will offer a non-exclusive, no-royalty license to all legitimate pharmaceutical manufacturers. Negotiations will not be required, and transaction costs will remain very minimal.
In order to maximize the geographic reach of the generic licenses, and to ensure competition in each country, drugs licensed under this system which are pre-qualified by the WHO should be granted automatic marketing approval in all of the target countries, a form of reference approval in lieu of a country by country ANDA process. 81 
D. Setting the Buy-Out Price 82
The buy-out price must be set high enough to optimize global pharmaceutical innovation and low enough to be affordable for all global diseases. Lanjouw and Jack effectively set the price at zero by requiring drug companies to choose between patents in rich countries or poor countries. 83 If global pharmaceutical appropriation is already supra-optimal, then zero (or a negative value) is the correct price. 84 Policymakers should have transparent access to reliable data on global pharmaceutical innovation in order to answer that question.
If the goal of the buy-out price is to mimic what would have happened under best-case competitive market conditions, then the price should be based on expected profits rather than sales or costs. Ganslandt, Maskus & Wong used cost data to calculate their buy-out price, which rewards effort rather than success. 85 Gross sales are certainly an element of pharmaceutical appropriation, but the relevant market metrics are the net present value (NPV) of the cash flow or the NPV of the profit stream. The purpose of the buy-out price should be to restore the expected profits, and more particularly, the lost R&D cost recovery.
Expected future profits will of course be difficult to estimate and subject to gaming. The following formula relies to the greatest extent possible on externally generated data, to avoid data manipulation and methodological squabbles, with retrospective experience adjustments: BOP = NPV t (d) (U * M) p BOP is the buy-out price; NPV is the net present value over the patent period t at discount rate d; U is the number of generic units sold in the target markets by all sellers during t; M is the marginal cost of production per unit, estimated as the lowest sustained actual price per unit during t; p is a profit adjustor, reflecting the percentage of profits allocated to R&D cost recovery (17% in the simple models above).
Estimated payments could be made at buy-out, subject to periodic and retrospective adjustment as actual data developed on u and m, and perhaps for changes in d. The formula minimizes the need to know actual costs, profits, or average sales prices. The only data required are actual number of generic unit sales and the lowest sustained price by any generic seller in the target markets. Both are relatively easy to collect and difficult for the patent holder (or anyone else) to manipulate.
This formula aligns incentives against rent-seeking and allocative inefficiency in helpful ways. The license encourages any pharmaceutical company to manufacture and sell the drug generically in all target markets. Competition will drive the unit price down towards the actual marginal cost of production. In a competitive market with multiple entrants, no single company controls either u or m, but they each have strong market incentives to maximize u and to 85 minimize m, which translates into the greatest access for a marketdetermined low price.
CONCLUSION
For a remarkably modest price, the battles over TRIPS and essential medicines could be resolved. Pharmaceutical rent appropriation could be avoided in low-and middle-income countries, while fully protecting innovation incentives. As the chronic diseases of the rich and poor worlds converge, a noble opportunity arises for doing well while doing good.
